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ABSTRACT
The IS research literature has tested the applicability of option pricing models to IS projects mostly 
through detailed case studies.  The current study complements this literature by considering a wide set 
of IS projects and assessing, albeit crudely, their optional value.  We test the literature’s assumption 
that IS projects embed significant optional value.  Our research site is a European plant of a leading 
multinational manufacturer of sophisticated products. The portfolio of current and recent IS projects 
is studied through a questionnaire administered to all project managers. Seventeen project managers 
were interviewed concerning thirty-one projects with median cost of $325k and median benefit of 
$1.2m.
We find strong support to the prediction that IS projects include considerable optional value.   The 
thirty one projects we studied embed forty seven options, many of them with benefits comparable to 
the value of the original projects.  Only four projects had no optional value.  A comparison between a 
subset of the portfolio and the corresponding scale-up options shows that the exercise price of the 
options is 20% of the original projects’ cost, and that the value of these options is about 70% of the 
original projects’ value. This data also demonstrates the large return, of scale-up options – the 
median return is 1500%, five fold the median return of projects. 
The main practical implication of this study is that real option evaluation is useful for IS projects in 
general, and should not be confined to special cases.  A further implication is that real option thinking 
may be of particular value in recognising reduction and deferral options.  The project managers in 
our study found such options difficult to identify and considered their time to expiration as relatively 
short.  Proactive management of reduction and deferral options should thus increase the flexibility 
and value of IS projects. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Careful evaluation of IS investment is of particular importance nowadays after a period characterised 
by over-investment.   The application of option pricing models to IS projects has been advocated for a 
number of reasons, including the inherent flexibility in such projects [Kumar, 1997], the infrastructure 
development and wait-and-see deployment-opportunities typical of many projects [Benaroch and 
Kauffman, 1999] [Taudes et al., 2000], the strategic value of IS investment  [Benaroch and Kauffman, 
1999], and the fact that opportunities in the digital economy are not obvious and by the time they 
become apparent, the window for investment has closed [Kulatilaka and Venkatraman, 1999].   
Indeed, the applicability of option pricing models to IS projects has been discussed and tested in the 
research literature.   The empirical tests consist of case studies, each illustrating a specific evaluation 
technique. These include a calculation of the optimal timing for deploying a point-of-sale debit 
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services network [Benaroch and Kauffman, 1999 and 2000], an evaluation of an upgrade for a SAP 
package at a car parts manufacturer [Taudes, 1998] [Taudes et al., 2000], and an analysis of a two-
stage investment in an imaging system by a mortgage bank [Kulatilaka et al., 2000].   
The current study aims to complement this literature by considering a wide set of IS projects and by 
assessing, albeit crudely, their optional value.  Our aim is to test the prediction (or assumption) of the 
literature that IS projects embed significant optional value.  Although this prediction is intuitively 
appealing, it has not been tested empirically.  We have studied 31 projects at a multinational 
manufacturer through structured interviews with all of its IS project managers.  These respondents 
identified 47 options, many of them with benefits comparable to the value of the original projects.  We 
have found that project managers more readily identify scale-up options over reduction and deferral 
options and that the exercise time for the later is relatively short.  A strong correlation between scale-
up cost, benefit and timing and the parameters of the original projects have been found; however, no 
correlation with uncertainty score has been measured.  
This paper continues in Section 2 with a brief and abstract introduction to real options. Section 3 
describes the research method and instruments and Section 4 depict the project portfolio.  The main 
findings, the options, are presented in three sub-sections: scale-ups (§5.1), reductions (§5.2), and 
deferrals (§5.3).  Section 6 is an analysis and discussion, and a brief conclusions-section ends the 
paper.
2. REAL OPTIONS 
The concept of real options is based upon the fact that managers have the flexibility to alter decisions 
as further information becomes available. If conditions are favourable, a project may be expanded to 
take advantage of these conditions. On the other hand, if circumstances become unfavourable, a 
project may be curtailed or even cancelled as the conditions warrant. These discretionary actions can 
be referred to as real options,  made available to the management as part of a project, and allow to 
expand or contract investment according to changing environmental conditions [Brealey and Myers, 
2000].  
Traditional investment appraisal techniques, such as net present value, have been criticised because of 
their inadequacy in modelling uncertainty and management flexibility.  A negative net present value of 
a project is usually taken as a signal that the investment should not take place.  However, that same 
investment could still generate valuable options, which in favourable circumstances could make the 
initial investment worthwhile.  
Real option evaluation corrects this deficiency by using financial option pricing to evaluate investment 
under uncertainty. Financial options refer to the right, but not the obligation,  to buy or sell a financial 
asset at a predetermined exercise price on, or before, a given expiration date.  Pricing models of such 
options use the ability to trade and replicate assets and assumptions of risk neutrality and known 
probability distributions to derive pricing formulae.  For example, the Black-Scholes formula shows 
that the value of an option to buy a stock is positively related to the price of the stock itself, the time 
before the option expires, the standard deviation per period of the rate of return on the stock, and the 
risk free interest rate; the option value is negatively related to the exercise price.  
There is a large body of literature about the application of option pricing to project evaluation, 
including an annual international conference (see: realoptions.org). Most work to-date is in the oil and 
mining industries and both the large consulting firms and specialist consultancies (ROgroup.com, real-
options.com) promote this method.  A recent panel at ICIS concluded that although assumptions of 
option pricing are mostly untrue for IS projects, the insights gained from using these methods are 
useful [Kauffman et al., 2001].  
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3. METHOD
The current study considers a wide set of IS projects and assesses their optional value.  Our aim is to 
complement the existing literature that evaluates single projects and to test the prediction that IS 
projects embed significant optional value.  In order to prevent bias in the selection of projects, we 
study a complete portfolio at a single research site.  However, we limit our investigation to the 
optional value of each project separately, and do not consider either the interaction between projects or 
a detailed portfolio risk profile [McFarlan, 1981]. 
Our research site is a European plant of a leading multinational manufacturer of sophisticated 
products; we denote this plant by ‘Déan’, which is the Irish word for ‘to make’. The portfolio of 
current and recent IS projects within Déan has been studied through a questionnaire administered to all 
Déan’s project managers.  Our initial plan to delineate the portfolio by the annual budgetary 
documents failed, as there are no central lists of projects within Déan.  Instead, we were given access 
to all software development project managers, and we asked each to identify his or her three most 
recent projects.  These included any project from initial concept investigation to fully implemented 
ones.  Interviews were conducted face to face and typically lasted thirty minutes per project; in most 
cases we had an introductory interview, which covered one project, and a secondary interview, after a 
few days, to cover the additional one or two projects.  
The study of a wide set of projects necessitated a simple and short questionnaire.  We chose as our 
guiding perspective the option application chapter of Brealey and Myers [2000], because of its 
simplicity and clarity.  The chapter classifies three common and important real options found in capital 
investment projects: 
?? An expansion, or scale-up, is the option to make a follow-on investments if the immediate 
investment project succeeds. 
?? A reduction, or scale-down, is the option to abandon planned investments in a project. 
?? A deferral is the option to wait and learn before investing. 
The chapter discusses the cost, benefits and timing of options,  and the volatility of the underlying 
assets – we used these simple issues to form our questionnaire.  Because of the difficulties in assessing 
future costs and benefits, we allowed answers in terms relative to the original project parameters.  In 
particular, we asked whether the costs and benefits of the option are much smaller, smaller, similar, 
larger, or much larger than the original costs and benefits.  Furthermore, the conceptual and practical 
difficulties in estimating volatility [Benaroch and Kauffman, 2000], convinced us to ask only for a 
rough assessment of the overall degree of uncertainty.  These compromises were possible because we 
did not attempt on calculating the option value and we concentrated on the identification of options 
and their basic parameters.   An initial questionnaire was tested by two pilot interviews and was 
discussed with the senior IT manager at Déan; the final research questionnaire is given in the 
appendix.
We present the data about the 31 projects using qualitative and quantitative tables; we use frequency 
tables to prevent the few large projects from distorting the analysis.  When actual costs and benefits 
are not known, the relative values are transformed into quantities by multiplying them with the 
original project parameters.  For example, when the benefits of a scale-up are related to the benefits of 
the original project, much smaller benefits are considered as 20% of the original ones, smaller as 50%, 
similar as equal to the original, larger as 200% and much larger as 1,000%. 
4. THE PORTFOLIO 
Seventeen project managers were interviewed about 31 projects, 14 of these projects were on-going 
and 17 already completed.  The newest project in the portfolio was in the definition phase and the 
oldest project was completed 18 months before the interview. Although we interviewed 17 managers 
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and asked for 3 recent projects from each, the final number of projects is smaller than expected, 
mainly because larger projects involved several managers.   The senior IT manager at Déan reviewed 
this set of projects and confirmed that it was typical of Déan and involved all IT disciplines at the site. 
Table 1, on the next page, presents the projects, sorted by cost; an item that is not available is marked 
by N/A; k denotes thousands of dollars and m denotes millions of dollars.  
Proj.
No.
Functionality Duration
(months)
Cost
($)
Benefit
($)
Uncertainty
(1-7)
1 Automating fault logging for building facilities 4 3k 40k 2
2 Automated time-logging by automation engineers 7 25k 300k 4
3 Remote and central monitoring of servers 4 25k 300k 3
4 Logistical DSS – delivery scheduling 6 28k N/A 7
5 Human Resource DSS – employee turnover analysis 6 30k 25k 4
6 Report generation for production work-in-process; 
used for passing information between shifts 
12 40k 1.8m 6
7 Electronic purchasing for facilities materials 18 50k 75k 7
8 System integration of call centre support services; 
will allow outsourcing 
4 78k N/A 5
9 Marketing DSS – identifies and compensates 
distributors who achieve sales targets  
16 90k 190k 5
10 A depository of firm training resources; facilitates 
internal training rather than external courses 
12 100k 1.2m 5
11 Production floor quality testing; expected to increase 
productivity 
3 135k 2.3m 2
12 Logging service history of tooling machines; will aid 
repair technicians 
16 160k 1m 6
13 Office IT Infrastructure set-up; will allow marketing 
tele-workers to work in a new location 
7 200k 200k 2
14 Cost control application for project  management 15 300k 300k 7
15 Data back up facility for laptops 4 300k 300k 4
16 Quality Control DSS –removes defective products 
early during the production to save production costs 
7 325k 30m 4
17 Knowledge management tool for corporate intranet 12 350k 3.5m 7
18 System integration with Déan’s IT infrastructure of a 
newly acquired company 1  
8 390k N/A 6
19 System integration with Déan’s IT infrastructure of a 
newly acquired company 2 
16 500k N/A 7
20 Network solution to capacity overload 12 500k 22m 6
21 Disaster recovery central system 12 800k 1.7m 5
22 Migrating legacy infrastructure to new non-propriety 
IT infrastructure; will reduce support costs 
32 1.1m 3m 3
23 Move to non proprietary database system 6 1.1m 2.5m 6
24 System integration with Déan’s IT infrastructure of a 
newly acquired company 3 
6 1.5m 3m 6
25 Software upgrade for production process tools 15 5m 1.2m 2
26 Worldwide firm Y2K system upgrade and audit 25 10m N/A 4
27 Integration of the production process tools 33 10.5m 30m 6.5
28 Marketing and sales office IT infrastructure 12 13m 20m 7
29 Increase processing capacity for shop floor systems 13 30m N/A 4
30 IT infrastructure for a new production floor 16 60m N/A 5
31 IT infrastructure for the next generation production  32 95m N/A 5.5
Table 1: Projects
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Porter’s [1985] value chain is utilised to demonstrate where our projects fall within Déan’s operations.  
As can be seen from Figure 1, projects are spread throughout the value chain with a concentration in 
Operations/Technology-Development; this seems reasonable for a manufacturing company. 
Support
activities
Corporate
Infrastructure
9
Human
Resource
Management
1 2     
Technology 
Development
3 8 1 2 3  
 Procurement 2      
Inbound
logistics Operations
Outbound
logistics
Sales and 
Marketing
Service 
Primary 
activities
     
Figure 1: Number of projects for value chain classes 
Table 2 presents the project cost and benefit frequencies; for example, seven projects had costs below 
$50K, three projects above $50K and below $100K, and so on.  The benefits for eight projects are not 
available, as project managers could not estimate them with confidence.  
Projects
below this sum ($) 
50k 100k 1m 10m 100m 
Cost 7 3 11 5 5
23% 10% 35% 16% 16% 
Benefit 2 1 7 8 5
9% 4% 30% 35% 22% 
Table 2: Cost/Benefit frequencies 
The cost of most projects is between $100k and $1m and five are ‘mega-projects’ with costs above 
$10m.  The frequency of high benefit is relatively higher (57% above $1m) than the frequency high 
cost (32%).  Indeed, the median project cost is $325k and the median project benefit is $1.2m; 
similarly, the median return – benefit on cost - for the 23 projects with both cost and benefit data is 
290%.   Managers were asked for their agreement with the statement that “the overall degree of 
uncertainty in this project is much higher than in Déan’s typical IS projects”.  The answers were on a 
Likert scale from with 1 - strongly disagree, 2 – disagree, 3 – somewhat disagree 4 – neutral, 5 – 
somewhat agree, 6 – agree, and 7 - strongly agree.   The frequencies of responses are presented in 
Table 3.  The median value is 5 (some agreement) which we interpret as consistent with Déan’s 
culture of risk taking in order to be first to market.  
Uncertainty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Number of 
Projects
0 4 2 6 5 7 7 
Table 3: Frequency of project uncertainty 
There is no significant correlation between the project uncertainty scores and other project parameters.  
We tried to further assess the underlying volatility of the projects by asking the project managers for 
either a market sector or a publicly traded company that are similar to the project.  Only for eight of 
the projects managers were able to identify a sector or company which fits well the project; for 
example, a specific production tooling company.  For most projects, the sector or company suggested 
did not fit well the project; for example, the software services sector and SAP were mentioned for 
several projects. 
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5. THE OPTIONS 
Most projects, twenty-seven in number, included options, typically either one or two options per 
project.  Only four projects had no options – these are projects 4, 7, 8, and 20; three of these are 
relatively small with cost below $100k.  The frequency of embedded options in the portfolio is 
represented in Table 4; the next sub-sections describe the three classes of options in some detail. 
Number of options  
per project 
0 1 2 3 4
Number of Projects  4 12 14 1 1
Table 4: Frequency of options 
4.1. Scale-Up
A scale-up option is defined as the ability to make any additional investment, which becomes 
beneficial as a direct result of the initial project investment. Table 5, on the next page, presents data 
about the 30 scale-up options: the first column gives the original project number, and the exercise time 
column represents the time (after project start) when the scale-up could have been exercised until.
The table is sorted by the option cost.  However, the column of the original project numbers 
(representing their cost ranking in the portfolio) is also in ascending order demonstrating the 
correlation between costs.  Indeed, the scale-up cost is correlated with the project cost (r=0.95; p<1%), 
the scale-up benefit is correlated with the project benefit (r=0.48; p<1%), and the exercise time is 
correlated with the project duration (r=0.60; p<1%).  Cross correlations (project-cost/scale-up benefit, 
etc.) are also positive and significant; there is no significant correlation between the project risk scores 
and the scale up parameters.  The reasons for the scale-up options are presented in Table 6.  They 
include new functionality, addition of capacity, users, departments, and sites, and commercialisation 
of a project.
Reason Projects Number of options 
Additional  functionality 1, 2 (twice), 9, 12, 16, 21, 23, 27 9 
Capacity expansion 13, 18, 19, 24, 29, 30, 31 7 
Increase in the number of users  2 (twice), 10 3 
Application in more departments 3, 9, 14, 21, 22, 26, 27 7 
Implementation in other sites  5, 6, 11, 12, 15, 28 6 
External sale of the project 17 1 
Table 6: Scale-up reasons 
Table 7 presents the frequencies of scale-ups by cost and benefit; data about the benefit of six scale-ups is not 
available.
Number of options 
below this sum ($) 
50k 100k 1m 10m 100m 
Scale-up Cost 11 2 10 6 1
37% 7% 33% 20% 3% 
Scale-up Benefit 1 2 10 6 5
4% 8% 42% 25% 21% 
Table 7: Scale-up cost/benefit frequencies 
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Proj
No.
Option functionality Exercise
Time
(months)
Cost
($)
Benefit
($)
1 Replace administration personnel with additional 
functionality to the fault logging system 
5 8k 80k
2 Expand functionality of the time tracking system; will 
allow to add new users 
12 10k 750k
2 Yet more functionality and users to the time tracking 
system 
10 12.5k 675k
3 Monitor additional departmental servers by the remote 
monitoring system 
24 25k 3m 
5 Install the employee turnover DSS in other sites 16 19k 250k
6 Install the work-in-process reporting in other 
manufacturing sites 
24 40k 1.8m 
9 Analyse the data collected by the distributor target-
achievement system 
12 4k 95k
9 Addition of marketing channel programs to the 
distributor target-achievement system 
12 4.5k 190k
10 Add users to the depository of internal training 
resources
3.5 10k 2.4m 
11 Install the production floor quality testing system in 
additional sites 
4 20k 2.3m 
12 Install the service history logging system in additional 
sites
16 32k 10m 
12 Capture more information about certain tooling 
processes into the logging of service history  
16 80k 500k
13 Expand capacity of the office IT infrastructure 12 400k 400k
14 Add departments as users of the project cost control 
system 
4 150k 300k
15 Install the laptop backup system in other sites 8 600k 600k
16 Capture more information about certain tooling 
processes; will allow better quality control 
16 325k 30k
17 Sell externally the intranet knowledge management tool 14 2m 100m 
18 Add IT infrastructure to the newly integrated WAN 8 78k N/A
19 Add IT infrastructure to the newly integrated WAN 15 250k N/A
21 Add data archiving to the disaster recovery system 12 160k 875k
21 Add departments to the disaster recovery system 24 200k 3.5m 
22 Migrate more legacy databases to the new non-
propriety system  
24 220k 50k
23 Add DSS capability to the non-proprietary database 4 150k 40m 
24 Add IT infrastructure to the newly integrated WAN 5 187k 600k
26 Upgrade additional systems as part of the 2000 
compatible upgrade and audit 
6 2m N/A
27 Expand functionality and deploy in another part of the 
production process 
36 5m 65m 
28 Install the marketing and sale IT infrastructure in other 
sites
9 5m 40m 
29 Further processing capacity increase in the shop floor 
systems 
24 7m N/A
30 Increase processing capacity of the new production 
floor  
28 6m N/A
31 Increase processing capacity of the next generation 
production  floor 
24 19m N/A
Table 5: Scale-ups 
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The scale-ups cost is lower than the original projects – 37% of them are below $50K.  The frequency 
of high benefit is higher (46% above $1m).  Stated differently, the median scale-up cost is $155k, and 
the median scale-up benefit is $713k.  The median values for the original projects are – cost $325, 
benefit $1.2m.   When returns, benefit on cost, are calculated for the 24 scale-ups with both cost and 
benefit data, the median value is 1500%; the median return for the original projects is 290%.  It seems 
that scale-up options are able to leverage the original investment making them very attractive.  
4.2. Reductions
A reduction option is defined as the ability to scale down the initial investment or abandon planned 
investments, should conditions prove unfavourable.  Twelve projects were identified as having 
reduction options. The ability to execute reductions expires relatively early in the project duration 
when compared to scale-ups.  Table 8 presents the data about reductions; data about the cost of one 
option is unavailable and data about the benefit reduction of one option is not included. Table 9 
presents the relevant frequencies. 
Proj.
No.
Reduction description Exercise
time
(months)
Cost
savings 
($)
Benefit
reduction
($)
5 Reduce the employee turnover DSS functionality if 
resources are needed elsewhere in the department 
4 N/A 9k
10 Keep the depository of training resources only at Déan 
and not in other of the firm sites 
2 20k 240k
13 Reduce capacity of the office IT infrastructure 1 100k 100k
14 Keep the project cost control system only at Déan and 
not in other of the firm sites 
4 75k 240k
17 Do not complete the knowledge management tool as a 
commercial product 
14 2m 100m 
21 Limit functionality and scale of the disaster recovery 
system 
4 300k 800k
23 Reduce processing power of the non-proprietary 
database 
3 100k 100k
extra benefit 
24 Eliminate duplicate systems between Déan and the 
newly acquired company 
2 525k 750k
25 Remove functionality of the software for process tools 1 250k 3.6m 
27 Reduce functionality of the process tools 12 5m 20m 
28 Reduce marketing office IT infrastructure to ‘must 
haves’
6 3.5m 2m 
31 Reduce processing capacity of the next generation  
production floor 
12 9.5m N/A
Table 8: Reductions 
Number of options 
below this sum ($) 
50k 100k 1m 10m 100m 
Cost savings 1 3 3 4 0
Benefit reduction 1 1 4 3 2
Table 9: Reduction frequencies 
Reasons for why a reduction could be necessary are both internal and external: 
?? External reasons offered by project managers were mainly change in market demand and legal 
compliance.   
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?? Internal reasons related to internal political risk, budget over-run, technical risk, limited resources 
and project management difficulties.  
While the internal reasons are more varied, external reasons were cited for eight out of the twelve 
reductions. This corresponds with Keil et al.’s [1998] observation regarding the significance of 
uncontrollable external risk in IS projects. In comparison, the exercise time for reductions is relatively 
short, with median of 4.0 months.  The exercise time for the scale-up options has a median of 12.0 
months, which is the same as the median project duration.   
4.3. Deferrals
A deferral option is defined as the opportunity to postpone the original investment in the project in 
order to wait and learn about the environmental conditions.  Table 10 presents the five deferral options 
identified.
Proj.
No.
Description Exercise
Time
(months)
Cost
reduction
($)
Benefit
Increase
($)
14 Re-analyze and design the cost control system 4 22 0
21 Wait for stability of the technical standards for the 
disaster recovery system  
10 0 0
25 Wait for new release of the process tools software 6 2.5m 0
29 Wait for data about market demand before increasing 
processing capacity for shop floor systems 
6 6m 0
30 Wait for the next generation of the relevant IT 
infrastructure before investing in the new shop floor 
6 35m    
extra cost 
N/A
Table 9: Deferrals 
All deferred projects were considered to be potentially beneficial because of the opportunity to reduce 
investment costs during the deferral period.  One project (number 30) would have increased its costs 
as deferral meant waiting for the release of the next generation of a product. The exercise time for 
deferrals is short with median of 6.0 months. 
Deferral options were rejected by many project managers due to contractual obligations with vendors 
and Déan’s culture of being first to market; some managers reported that it is difficult to be critical of 
your own project.  Where deferral options existed, they were primarily viewed as an opportunity to 
reduce project cost during the deferral period.
6. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
We have found strong support to the assumption, or prediction, that IS projects include considerable 
optional value.   The 31 projects we studied included 47 options, many of them with benefits 
comparable to the value of the original projects.  Only four projects had no optional value.  A full 
comparison between portfolio value and optional value is not possible because we do not have detailed 
enough data for option value calculation.  However, comparisons are possible between projects and 
scale-up options because their costs and benefits are conceptually similar.  In particular, the portfolio 
total cost is about $245m, the total cost, or exercise price, of the scale-up options is $50m, or about 
20% of the portfolio cost.  For the 20 projects where data about benefits (for both project and scale 
ups) is available, the total benefit is about $96m; the total benefit of the scale-up options for these 
projects is about $68m, or 70% of the original benefit.  These simple comparisons demonstrate that not 
only there are many options, but their costs and values are considerable.  This data also demonstrates 
the large return, benefit on cost, of scale-up options – the median return for scale-ups is 1500%, five 
fold of the median return for projects. 
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The reasons for the existence of options in information systems, as described in the literature, are 
indeed relevant in our portfolio:
?? The inherent flexibility in such projects [Kumar, 1997]: nine scale-ups consist of additional 
functionality and six reductions consist of not developing some functionality. 
?? The infrastructure development and wait-and-see deployment-opportunities typical of many 
projects [Benaroch and Kauffman, 1999] [Taudes et al., 2000]: twenty-three scale-up options 
consisted of addition of capacity, users, departments, or sites.  Several of these were related to IT 
infrastructure.
?? The strategic value of IS investment  [Benaroch and Kauffman, 1999]: many of the expansions 
allow relatively fast and inexpensive scale-up of production capacity that is of strategic 
importance for the multinational manufacturer.  Similarly, some of the reductions and deferrals 
allow fast scale-down in production capacity.   
?? Opportunities in the digital economy are not obvious and by the time they become apparent, the 
window for investment has closed [Kulatilaka and Venkatraman, 1999]: one option consisted of 
commercialisation of a project into a software package. 
An additional finding is that project managers more readily identified scale-up options over reduction 
and deferral.  The exercise time for reductions and deferrals was relatively short.  This may be a 
general phenomenon related to the flexibility and infrastructural nature of IS.  However, the 
characteristics of our research site may have enhanced it: Déan is a large multinational manufacturer 
that regularly transfers successful systems to additional sites and has a culture of gradual improvement 
in productivity.  Also, for the time span of many of the projects in the portfolio, Déan operated in a 
growing market and emphasised new products, growth in production capacity, and aggressive IS 
investment.  A third reason for the relative lack of reductions and deferrals is project managers’ bias.  
Many respondents remarked that it is difficult to be the ‘devil’s advocate’ for a project that you are 
meant to be the champion of. 
Another finding is the strong correlation between scale-up cost, benefit and timing and the parameters 
of the original projects.  However, we have not found correlation between option parameters and 
project uncertainty.  Do these results make sense?  Theoretically, options are more valuable when their 
exercise price is low, the value of the underlying asset is high, volatility is high, and the time horizon 
is long.  So, for example, the correlation between scale-up benefit and project benefit is expected. 
However,  it is unclear why there is no correlation between benefit and uncertainty score.  One 
explanation is that our uncertainty instrument is lacking: it includes only a single item, it is subjective, 
and we have not distinguished explicitly between uncertainty and risk.  Another possibility is that the 
simple theoretical interpretation presented here may be inappropriate.  Our portfolio consists of 
internal projects with flexible boundaries which may reflect reaction to risk.  So, for example, high 
risk may result in a small initial investment and a negative correlation between project and option, 
making our additional findings difficult to interpret. 
7. CONCLUSION
This study has found a considerable number and value of options in an IS project portfolio at a 
multinational manufacturer.  This result supports the prediction of the real-options IS literature, and is 
the first empirical evidence for the optional value of an IS project portfolio.
The main practical implication of this study is that real option evaluation is useful for IS projects in 
general, and should not be confined to special cases.  A further implication is that real option thinking 
may be of particular value in recognising reduction and deferral options.  The project managers in our 
study found such options difficult to identify and considered their time to expiration to be relatively 
short.  Proactive management of reduction and deferral options should thus increase the flexibility and 
value of IS projects. 
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Our conclusions are limited by the scope of this study: a single portfolio at a large manufacturer 
during a period of market growth.  Although our original goal was to utilise a simple and short 
questionnaire, we feel that our measurement instrument is too limited.  In particular, the classification 
of options, the reasons for exercising them, and data about uncertainty and risk are too limited.  A 
study of additional portfolios using a more elaborate questionnaire is called for.  A further limitation is 
the lack of analysis of interaction between projects; we feel that a careful definition of interacting 
options and their empirical study should be attempted in future research.  
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APPENDIX: THE RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE (PART 2 - PROJECT OPTIONS) 
The following questions investigate the potential options that may or may not have been enacted by 
the company. Answer the questions without using the benefit of hindsight, namely, use the managerial 
point of view at the time the project was started.  
1. Describe briefly the possibilities to expand the project or to have continuation projects? Yes/No  
a) How long after the initial project start date would such a scale-up have been possible and why 
would it have been useful? 
b) Roughly, how much would such a scale-up have cost?      
OR The costs from such a scale-up option in relation to the costs of the initial 
project would have been: (Circle one) 
Much
Smaller (1) 
Smaller (2) Similar (3) Larger (4) 
Much
Larger (5) 
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c) Roughly, what would have been the quantifiable benefits of such a scale-up?   
OR The benefits from such a scale-up option in relation to the benefits of the 
initial project would have been: (Circle one) 
Much
Smaller (1) 
Smaller (2) Similar (3) Larger (4) 
Much
Larger (5) 
d) What would have been the other benefits (if any) of such a scale-up option? 
2. What would have been the possibilities to reduce (or scale down) the project? Yes/No 
a) When, after the project start date, would have such a reduction been possible?  
b) Why would a reduction have been necessary?  
c) Roughly, how much could you have reduced the investment by? 
OR “The reduction in costs arising from the option to reduce the investment, as it related 
to the initial project costs would have been.” (Circle one) 
Very Small (1) Small (2) Half (3) Large (4) Very Large (5) 
d) Roughly, what would be the drop in project value or benefits?
OR “The benefits lost arising from the option to reduce the investment, as it related to the 
initial project benefits would have been.” (Circle one) 
Very Small (1) Small (2) Half (3) Large (4) Very Large (5) 
3. What would have been the possibilities to defer the starting date of the project? Yes/No  
a) For how long would it be possible to defer the project? 
b) What would have been the quantifiable benefits been (value from learning of market conditions 
or new technology, etc)? 
OR “The increase in benefits arising from the option to defer the investment, as it related 
to the initial project benefits would have been.” (Circle one) 
Very Small Small Similar Large Very Large 
c) Roughly, would this deferral reduce project costs? 
OR  “The reduction in costs arising from the option to defer the investment, as it related to the 
initial project costs would have been.” (Circle one) 
Very Small (1) Small (2) Half (3) Large (4) Very Large (5) 
     
4. What is the risk embedded in this project? 
a) “The overall degree of uncertainty in this project is much higher than in our typical IS projects?” 
Strongly
Disagree
(1)
Disagree
(2)
Somewhat 
Disagree
(3)
Neutral
(4)
Somewhat
Agree
(5)
Agree
(6)
Strongly
Agree
(7)
b) Would you know off-hand, of a market sector (or a company that is publicly traded), and similar 
to this project in terms of its operations and business type?  
